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MSRC

Security Research & Defense

MS08-014 : The Case of the Uninitialized Stack Variable Vulnerability

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

MS08-014, CVE 2008-0081, addresses a vulnerability in Excel whose root cause is an uninitialized stack variable. You probably have seen these types of compiler warnings before: C:\temp>cl stack.cpp Microsoft (R) 32-bit C/C++ Optimizing Compiler Version 15.00.21022.08 for 80x86 Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. stack.cpp c:\temp\stack.cpp(49) : warning C4700: uninitialized local variable 'pNoInit' used .

MS08-015: Protocol Handler and its Default Security Zone

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

MS08-015, CVE-2008-0110, addresses a vulnerability in Microsoft Outlook’s implementation of “mailto” URI handling. The attack can be launched via IE or other applications which invoke the “mailto” protocol. Applications can register pluggable protocol handlers to handle a custom Uniform Resource Locator (URL) protocol scheme. Here “mailto” is one example of the various protocol handles that can be registered.

The Kill-Bit FAQ: Part 2 of 3

Thursday, February 07, 2008

It is very common for Microsoft security bulletins to include “Kill-Bits” to disable individual ActiveX controls / COM objects. Here is the second part of our three-part Kill-Bit FAQ. The Kill-Bit FAQ – Part 2 of 3 How do ActiveX Controls, OLE Controls, and COM Objects relate? An ActiveX control is an OLE control that is intended to be used inside a web browser.

Not safe = not dangerous? How to tell if ActiveX vulnerabilities are exploitable in Internet Explorer

Sunday, February 03, 2008

In early January you may have read posts on security distribution lists regarding two ActiveX Controls released by Microsoft. We have investigated those controls and fortunately, they are not exploitable since IE does not treat them as being safe. We wanted to give you some background on how to evaluate whether a potential vulnerability found in an ActiveX control is an exploitable condition in Internet Explorer.

MS08-001 (part 2) – The case of the Moderate ICMP mitigations

Tuesday, January 08, 2008

This is the second post in the three-part series covering MS08-001. In this post we’ll look at the ICMP vulnerability (CVE-2007-0066) in more detail. This vulnerability is caused by Windows TCP/IP’s handling of the ICMP protocol, specifically regarding router advertisement messages. This post covers the mitigating factors for this vulnerability in more detail.

MS08-001 (part 3) – The case of the IGMP network critical

Tuesday, January 08, 2008

This is the final post in the three-part series covering MS08-001. In this post we’ll look at the IGMP vulnerability (CVE-2007-0069) and why we think successful exploitation for remote code execution is not likely. This vulnerability is around Windows’ handling of the IGMP and MLD protocols. These two protocols are used to control multicast traffic over IPv4 and IPv6 networks, enabling hosts to advertise their intention to send & receive multicast traffic.