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Month Archives: December 2013

Predictions for 2014 and the December 2013 Security Bulletin Webcast, Q&A, and Slide Deck

Monday, December 16, 2013

Today we’re publishing the December 2013 Security Bulletin Webcast Questions & Answers page. We answered 17 questions in total, with the majority of questions focusing on the Graphics Component bulletin (MS13-096), Security Advisory 2915720 and Security Advisory 2905247. We also wanted to note a new blog on the Microsoft Security Blog site on the top cyber threat predications for 2014.

Software defense: mitigating common exploitation techniques

Wednesday, December 11, 2013

In our previous posts in this series, we described various mitigation improvements that attempt to prevent the exploitation of specific classes of memory safety vulnerabilities such as those that involve stack corruption, heap corruption, and unsafe list management and reference count mismanagement. These mitigations are typically associated with a specific developer mistake such as writing beyond the bounds of a stack or heap buffer, failing to correctly track reference counts, and so on.

Assessing risk for the December 2013 security updates

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Today we released eleven security bulletins addressing 24 CVE’s. Five bulletins have a maximum severity rating of Critical while the other six have a maximum severity rating of Important. We hope that the table below helps you prioritize the deployment of the updates appropriately for your environment. Bulletin Most likely attack vector Max Bulletin Severity Max XI Likely first 30 days impact Platform mitigations and key notes MS13-096(GDI+ TIFF parsing) Victim opens malicious Office document.

MS13-098: Update to enhance the security of Authenticode

Tuesday, December 10, 2013

Today we released MS13-098, a security update that strengthens the Authenticode code-signing technology against attempts to modify a signed binary without invalidating the signature. This update addresses a specific instance of malicious binary modification that could allow a modified binary to pass the Authenticode signature check. More importantly, it also introduces further hardening to consider a binary “unsigned” if any modification has been made in a certain portion of the binary.